Determinants of Corporate Disclosure in Financial Statements: Evidence from Vietnamese Listed Firms

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Abstract—Using data of listed firms on Hochiminh Stock Exchange, the study examines determinants of corporate disclosure in financial statements. In line with the literature, the findings show that firm size, the use of financial leverage and the presence of supervision board have a positive influence on corporate disclosure. Furthermore, auditing firm (whether a Big4 or not) also plays an important role in the degree of information disclosure by firms. Contradicting to the literature, however state ownership and the proportion of non-executive members in director board show a negative relation to corporate disclosure level. These counter facts can be explained by real situations of Vietnam over the studied period. Finally, the concurrent role between chair of director board and managing director reduces corporate disclosure degree, as predicted by the agency theory.

Keywords—Corporate disclosure, listed firms, Vietnam, signaling theory, agency theory.

I. INTRODUCTION

Corporate disclosure is very necessary and important for investors on the financial market. The more corporate disclosure is provided to the market, the less asymmetric information is between firms and investors, and also between firms and other agents (government agencies, banks, business partners). This helps to reduce agency problem. Corporate disclosure hence is an important factor that directly influences the decision making of market participants who mainly obtain information through firms' financial statements. The obtaining and screening of corporate information is even more necessary for investors in an emerging stock market like Vietnam. However, the disclosure degree varies among firms and its determinants have still been an open question for both academics and practitioners.

Many empirical studies on the determinants of corporate disclosure in financial statements have been implemented for countries around the world (e.g., Patton and Zelenka, 1997; Ahmed and Courtis, 1999; Owusu-Ansah, 1998; Bushman, Piotroski et al. Cheung, Connelly et al., 2006 ...). For Vietnam, research on this issue is also conducted, for example, Phuong and Phuong (2014). Nevertheless, this study is different from the previous ones in a number of aspects. Firstly, in this study, the effect of some factors that are not considered by the other research is investigated (e.g., fixed assets, sectors, corporate governance variables such as the size and composition of director board, management structure and board of supervisors). In addition, the sample in this study has a slightly larger number of observations than previous ones, which shows a better representation for Vietnamese listed firms.

The remainder of this study is structured as follows. In section 2, empirical studies on the issue are reviewed, while the methodology is presented in section 3. Section 4 shows empirical results of the study. Finally, conclusions and policy recommendations are shown in section 5.

II. LITERATURE SURVEY

Examples of empirical research on the determinants of corporate disclosure for countries in the world can be seen as follows. Singhvi (1968) examines the factors influencing corporate disclosure of Indian companies in the period from 1963 to 1965, including firm size, profit, marginal profit, auditing firm, management type and major shareholder number. The results show that size, management structure, and major shareholder number are statistically related to corporate disclosure, while the remaining variables are not correlated to corporate disclosure. Raffournier (1995) tests the influence of size, financial leverage, profitability, ownership structure, internationalized degree, auditor's size, the fixed-asset-to-total-asset ratio and sector on disclosure of Swiss listed firms in 1991. Results show that only size and internationalized degrees play a statistically significant role in the company's disclosure policy. Patton and Zelenka (1997) find that auditing type, number of
employees, status of listed securities and returns on equity show a significant effect on the corporate disclosure of joint-stock firms in Czech Republic. Owusu-Ansah (1998) points out that size, ownership structure, age, internationalized degree and profitability are significantly associated with disclosure of listed firms in Zimbabwe. For listed firms in Kenya in 1992-2001, Barako (2007) find that corporate governance features and corporate characteristics. In Vietnam, studies using different approaches, significantly influence corporate disclosure and data samples are also conducted. For example, Phuong and Phuong (2014) show that size, auditing firm, profitability, listing time and ownership of foreign shareholders are significantly related to the corporate disclosure of 99 listed firms on Hochi minh stock exchange in 2011.

III. METHODOLOGY

3.1 Data
The sample consists of 198 non-financial listed firms (accounting for approximately of 66% of the population). Data are obtained from the audited financial statements in 2013 of listed firms on the Ho Chi Minh stock exchange. Financials are not included in the sample due to their particular characteristics, i.e they are subject to strict regulations and have a different accounting mechanism.

3.2 Empirical specification:
Dependent variable - corporate disclosure index: Since firms produce the financial statements subject to Decision 16/2006, together with the Circular 210/2009-BTC and 244/2009-BTC issued by Ministry of Finance of Vietnam, the list of corporate disclosure items is constructed based on these legal documents. This study utilizes the approach by previous studies with some adjustments for current context of Vietnam. More specifically, all possible disclosure items from financial statements shown in notes to financial statement are taken. Hence, a checklist of maximum number of 120 disclosure items in the financial statements, comprising of both legally compulsory and voluntary disclosure items, is presented in table 1. Then the corporate disclosure index, measuring the corporate disclosure degree, is calculated by the ratio of number of disclosed items to the maximum number of disclosure items (e.g., Barako (2007)).

Corporate disclosure index reads

\[ I_j = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n_j} X_{ij}}{n_j} \]

in which: \( I_j \) is disclosure of firm j (0 ≤ \( I_j \) ≤ 1); \( n_i \) shows the maximum number of disclosed items of firm j (\( n_i \) ≤ 120); \( X_{ij} = 1 \) if item i occurs and is released by firm, \( X_{ij} = 0 \) if the item i occurs but is unreleased by firm, \( X_{ij} \) is not counted if item i does not occur; \( X_c \) comprises of both obligatory and disclosed items. All these items \( (X_q) \) are equally weighted summed in calculating corporate disclosure index \( I_0 \) to avoid biases in assigning weights to items due to subjective assessments.

Definition of all independent variables: Based on the literature, this study investigates a number of factors which can be classified into two groups: corporate operating characteristics and corporate governance characteristics. (see, e.g., Hossain et al, 1994; Wallace và Naser, 1995; Barako, 2007; Phuong và Phuong, 2014; Singhi, 1968; Ahmed và Curtis, 1999). All independent variables are defined as follows:

+ Variables proxy for corporate operating characteristics:
  - SIZE (Billion VND) - Corporate size: defined as logarithm of total sales
  - PROFIT (%) - Profitability: defined as net profits divided by total sales
  - DEBT (Times) - Debt ratio: defined as total debts divided by owner’s equity
  - FASSETS (%) - Fixed assets: defined as [fixed assets – accumulated depreciation] divided by total assets
  - BIG4 - Audit firm: Equal to 1 if firm is audited by a Big4-auditing firm, and equal to 0 otherwise
  - LTIME (Years) - Listing time: defined as the time period from listing year up to year of 2013

\[ \text{Table 1. Summary of corporate disclosure items in financial statements} \]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contents</th>
<th>Number of items</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Items are related to balance sheet</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Items are related to income statement</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Items are related to cash flow statement</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Items must be presented on notes to financial statements as required by circular 210/2009/TT-BTC issued by Ministry of Finance</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Items are indicated to notes to financial statements itself</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 The list of items is available upon request.
SECTOR - Sectors: Equal to 1 if firm is in manufacturing sector, and equal to 0 otherwise
FOREIGN (%) - Foreign ownership: defined as foreign-owned shares divided by total shares
STATE (%) - State ownership: defined as state-owned shares divided by total shares
+ Variables proxy for corporate governance characteristics:
BOARDSIZE (people) - Director board size: defined as number of members in director board
BOARDCOMP (%) - Director board composition: defined as number of non-executive director members divided by total number of members in director board

DUALITY - Chairperson of director board takes dual positions: Equal to 1 if firm’s chairman of director board is concurrent the general director, and equal to 0 otherwise
SUPERV - Supervision board: Equal to 1 if firm has a supervision board, and equal to 0 otherwise

3.3 Estimation method
The regression specification is estimated using OLS method. In addition, the tests to check for reliability of the regression results are also performed such as multi-collinearity (variance inflation factor (VIF)), heteroschedasticity (White test) and autocorrelation (Lagrange (LM)).

IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
4.1 Correlation matrix between variables and summary statistics of variables
The correlation matrix between variables is presented in table 2, while table 3 shows the summary statistics of all variables. As can be seen from Table 2, the correlation between variables is fairly small (almost less than 0.4), therefore the possible effects of multi-collinearity in OLS regressions are negligible. Yet, a statistical check via VIF test is sobering.

Table 2: Correlation matrix between variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SIZ E</th>
<th>QRA TIO</th>
<th>PRO FIT</th>
<th>DE BT</th>
<th>FASS ETS</th>
<th>BIG 4</th>
<th>LTI ME</th>
<th>SECT OR</th>
<th>FORE IGN</th>
<th>STA TE</th>
<th>BOARD SIZE</th>
<th>BOARD COMP</th>
<th>DUAL ITY</th>
<th>SUPE RV</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SIZE</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QRATIO</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROFIT</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>0.147</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>DEBT</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>-0.220</td>
<td>-0.20</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FASSET</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>-0.184</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>BIG4</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>-0.035</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
<td>-0.092</td>
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<tr>
<td>LTME</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>-0.136</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
<td>0.026</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SECTOR</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>0.144</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.180</td>
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<tr>
<td>FOREIGN</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.186</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STATE</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.165</td>
<td>0.024</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.024</td>
<td>0.1292</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOARD SIZE</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>0.101</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.165</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.024</td>
<td>-0.15</td>
<td>0.3202</td>
<td>0.36</td>
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<tr>
<td>BOARD COMP</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.038</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.026</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.1727</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.2287</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DUALITY</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>-0.055</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.058</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>-0.1034</td>
<td>-0.1538</td>
<td>-0.4493</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>SUPERV</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>0.032</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.056</td>
<td>0.1460</td>
<td>-0.1115</td>
<td>-0.0422</td>
<td>0.0152</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

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be considered as a firm wants to disclosed in attempts to more good information (e.g., sales increases) is needed to dissolved and bankrupted. Given these circumstances, more good information (e.g., sales increases) is needed to disclose in attempts to increase the confidence of investors and credit institutions.  

4.2 Findings

The regression results are presented in Table 4. The value of VIF for all independent variables is much smaller than 10 (i.e. even smaller than 2), confirming that multicollinearity is not problematic. Moreover, Lagrange (LM) test cannot reject the null hypothesis that no autocorrelation in the error terms of the model (p-value = 0.5432). Likewise, White test also shows the absence of heteroscedasticity in the model (p-value = 0.6565). From Table 4, it can be seen that the coefficient of SIZE, DEBT, AUDIT and SUPERV is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level. However, the coefficient of STATE, BOARDCOMP and DUALITY is statistically negatively at the significance level of 10%, except for STATE at the 5% level of significance. These findings can be further discussed as follows. Firstly, regression results show that corporate size (SIZE) has a positive effect on its disclosure, implying that the higher the sales, the more information firm discloses in the financial statements. This is consistent with most previous empirical studies, such as Raffournier, 1995; Patton and Zelenka, 1997; Ahmed and Courtis, 1999; Owusu-Ansah, 1998; Phuong and Phuong, 2014, ...), and also in accordance with the agency theory and signaling theory. In fact, an increase in sales can be considered as a positive message about its businesses that firm wants to send to shareholders and other outsiders. This is especially true for the real situations in Vietnam over the studied period, where the Vietnamese economy has been facing severe difficulties, and many firms have been dissolved and bankrupted. Given these circumstances, more good information (e.g., sales increases) is needed to disclose in attempts to increase the confidence of investors and credit institutions.

Table 3: shows the summary statistics for all variables. In general, since no outliers in data can be observed, OLS estimation is appropriate. Then it is safe to go further with all estimations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>S.D</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SIZE (Billion VND)</td>
<td>13.43</td>
<td>31.58</td>
<td>1.90</td>
<td>3.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QRATIO (Times)</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>17.57</td>
<td>2.11</td>
<td>2.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROFIT (%)</td>
<td>-45.40</td>
<td>44.30</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>22.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEBT (Times)</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>27.98</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>2.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FASSETS (%)</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>89.10</td>
<td>22.30</td>
<td>17.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTIME (Years)</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>13.00</td>
<td>4.96</td>
<td>2.571</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOREIGN (%)</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>49.00</td>
<td>14.80</td>
<td>16.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STATE (%)</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>79.70</td>
<td>17.80</td>
<td>22.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOARDSIZE (people)</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>11.00</td>
<td>6.53</td>
<td>1.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOARDCOMP (%)</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>63.90</td>
<td>17.20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: *, ** and *** denote the significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
As for debt ratio (DEBT), the results show that firm with a higher financial leverage tends to disclose more information, since as firm utilizes more debt the executives voluntarily disclose more information to increase its position to creditors, as well as to meet the information requirements by creditors. This is applicable with the current context of Vietnam, in which the use of excessive leverage by many firms has lead to higher risk of insolvency and bankruptcies. Hence, the corporate disclosure has become a way to show firm’s trust worthy to creditors. This result is in line with some others, e.g., Ahmed and Courtis, 1999; Barako, 2007, and is also consistent with the signaling theory. For auditing firm (AUDIT), it is obvious that firm audited by one of the Big4-auditor has a higher corporate disclosure degree than the others. This shows a clear distinction between the quality of a Big4-auditor and that of other auditors from the perspectives of market participants in the country. As audited by a member of Big4-auditors, firm seems to bemo more confident and ready to publish a greater amount of detailed information to outsiders. This finding is supported by previous research, (e.g., Patton and Zelenka, 1997; Barako, 2007; Wang, Sewon et al., 2008). In line with Ho and Wong (2001), results show that the presence of supervision board (SUPERV) has a positive influence on the corporate disclosure degrees. Since the supervision board is responsible for overseeing the board of directors and managing director in implementing their due roles, its existence is considered as a means to guarantee for the credibility of financial statements to outsiders (Bradbury, 1990). However, contradicting to previous studies, results for state ownership (STATE) in this study indicate that firm with higher state-owned shares disclose less information on financial statements than the others. Although being contrast to other previous studies, this finding is reasonable in the context of Vietnam. In Vietnam, there historically exists a common belief that state-dominated firms are problematic. Many state-dominated firms suffered severely from a number of problems such as poor performance, bad corporate governance practices and disclosure of corruption by managers who are also governmental officials. E.g., in 2014, more than 400 state-owned firms were bankrupted and dissolved, namely bankruptcy of 92 enterprises and dissolution of 313. Therefore, the presence of state ownership in firm does not necessarily mean an increase in the corporate disclosure level. Surprisingly, the coefficient of director board composition (BOARDCOMP) shows a significantly negative sign, indicating that firm with a higher proportion of non-executive members to total number of director board tends to have a higher corporate disclosure degree. This is counter evidence against the agency theory, proposing that members of director board should not take any executive role in the firm. Nevertheless, this opposite effect (but is in line with Barako (2007)), may be explained by the fact that a high proportion of non-executive board member in director board may imply a high number of managing executive members from outside the firm. In an emerging market like Vietnam, these outside executives tend to limit the corporate disclosure as a way to protect firm’s businesses from its competitors, which helps them to secure their positions in the firm. As expected, the findings from dual role of director board’s chairperson (DUALITY) point out that if a company has a concurrent duty between chairperson and general director, the corporate disclosure degrees reduced. In fact, as argued by the agency theory this dual role can easily lead to power concentration, resulting in possible manipulations of corporate financial activities, as well as restrictions on information disclosure by firms. The coefficient of all other independent variables including QRATIO, PROFIT, FASSETS, LTIME, SECTOR, FOREIGN and BOARDSIZE is not statistically significant at the traditional significance levels. Therefore, the statistical evidence about the influences of these factors on the corporate disclosure cannot be found in this study.

V. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

Due to the great importance of corporate disclosure on the financial statements, many empirical studies have been implemented for countries around the world. This study investigates the determinants of corporate disclosure in Vietnamese listed firms. Several findings from the study can be summarized. Regression results show that as predicted by the literature firm size, the use of financial leverage and the presence of supervision board have a positive effect on the corporate disclosure degree. Moreover, firm audited by a member of Big4 group tends to disclose more information than the others. However, contradicting to the literature, those factors comprising of state ownership and the proportion of non-executive members in director board show a negative effect on corporate disclosure. This counterevidence can be explained by real situations in Vietnam. Finally, this study also supports the literature with the finding that firm with the concurrent role between chair of director board and managing director disclose less information than the others.
A number of recommendations have been put forward. Firstly, policy makers should pay more attention to the quality of auditing firms appointed to check financial statements of listed firms, since market participants seem to distinguish between financial statements audited by a Big4 and those audited by other auditing firms. Besides, stricter supervision rules should be considered on the structure of corporate management to improve the information disclosure quality by firms.

REFERENCES


